Findings underscore the importance of cost structure assumptions and that the impact of the type of oligopoly behavior assumed is not as dramatic when differences in demand and cost specifications are smoothed out.
Introduction
Accurate estimation of allocative efficiency losses due to oligopolistic behavior is crucial because the allocation of antitrust enforcement efforts is closely related to such estimates (Preston and Connor, 1992) . Consequently, there is a vast amount of literature measuring welfare losses due to oligopoly power in the U.S. manufacturing sector; however, there are often contradictory findings regarding the magnitude of these losses. For example, Siegfried and Tiemann (1974) concluded that welfare losses in the U.S. manufacturing sector were negligible, while Cowling and Mueller (1978) arrived at much larger estimates for the sector. Such contradictory findings are also common in the U.S. food and tobacco manufacturing sector.
Differences in production, demand, and pricing behavior assumptions used in this literature have led to quite divergent allocative efficiency results for the U.S. food manufacturing industries. Gisser (1982) estimates oligopoly welfare losses to be well below one percent of industry sales and thus opposes government intervention, while Winner (1989) estimates these losses to exceed five percent of sales, questioning the performance of these industries.
More recently, Bhuyan and Lopez (1993) and Connor and Peterson (1994) presented additional estimates of the oligopoly welfare losses in the U.S. food processing sector and found a wide spectrum of estimates for the same industries. For example, according to the simulation results of Connor and Peterson, the welfare loss estimates in the food industry (SIC 20) ranged from 0.2 percent to an impossibly high of 289 percent of sales, In spite of the apparent contradictions in empirical evidence, the current literature lacks a consistent comparison of welfare losses due to alternative oligopoly pricing regimes while smoothing out the differences due to demand and cost specification assumptions.
The objective of this article is to systematically estimate allocative efficiency losses in the U.S. food and tobacco manufacturing industries under alternative oligopoly pricing regimes stemming from the same model. 1 This is necessary in order to focus on the impact of such pricing behavior on welfare loss by overcoming a common drawback of the current literaturecomparing estimates of welfare losses derived from different models with dissimilar demand and marginal cost specifications (e.g., Gisser, 1982 vs. Winner, 1989 Connor and Peterson, 1994) . This is important because, beyond a pedagogical interest, antitrust policy debates are often based on estimates of oligopoly welfare losses which are subject to the researcher's discretion in adopting model assumptions. Therefore, using the same core model to explore the sensitivity of welfare loss estimates to alternative market and cost structure assumptions is timely.
The estimates of this study are derived from a formal model of oligopoly that relies on a built-in collusion parameter as well as explicit demand and marginal cost elasticities. The baseline scenario consists of industry-wide oligopoly pricing where every firm in the industry uses the same pricing rule (Winner and St&h], 1992) . This is extended to accommodate price leadership regimes. Six alternative pricing behaviors are empirically implemented: the baseline scenario (which uses a collusion parameter computed from data), industrywide Cournot behavior, and four price leadership scenarios corresponding to Cournot and perfectly collusive versions of Gisser's (1982) and Winner's (1989) pricing behaviors. Data for 44 food and tobacco manufacturing industries at the four-digit SIC level for 1987, the most recently available; are applied to the models.
Statistical tests of the differences of the means of the welfare losses reject industry-wide Cournot and Winner's collusive price leadership regimes. It is concluded that although much of the 578 debate on welfare losses in the food and tobacco manufacturing has been focused on whose estimates are right, many of the results do not differ greatly when the type of pricing behavior is taken into account, ceteris paribus.
The results also underscore the importance of cost structure assumptions.
The Model
The basic oligopoly model draws from the work of Dickson and Yu (1989) which is then extended to the price leadership case.
For numerical convenience, both the perfectly competitive output and price are indexed to 1. The industry demand curve is represented by Q = I/Pq; q >() where Q, P and -q are industry output, output price and absolute value of the price elasticity of demand, respectively. The industry marginal cost (MC) curve is denoted by Q = AKT, where E is the marginal cost flexibility.z Following Clarke and Davies (1982) , the Lerner index of oligopoly power (St')is given by
where P,v MCO, H, and IX are oligopoly price, oligopoly marginal cost, the Hertlndahl index and the collusion parameter. The collusion parameter denotes the proportional change in the output of rivals in response to a proportional change in a firm's output. In other words, cx represents the degree of industry-wide collusion, where Cournot and perfectly collusive behavior are given by u = O and ci = 1, respectively. Note that if the industry is perfectly competitive (SW)), then a = -H/(1 -H) <
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Using the industry marginal cost curve and (I), the oligopoly price
can be expressed as (2) where QOis oligopoly output. (4) To extend the basic model to the price leadership case, consider the case where a subset of n firms behave as price leaders,s The corresponding Lerner index for the group of leaders (Q") can be expressed as g n=[H''+an(l -H")]/qD, where q~is the elasticity of the residual demand faced by the leaders, and other notation is as defined before but superscripted with n. If the leaders behave as a Coumot oligopoly among themselves then an = 0, and if they collude then cd = 1. Following Carbon and Perloff (1990), the leaders' residual demand elasticity can be expressed as q~= [q +(3(1-CRn)j/CRn, where CRn is the sales share of the leaders or n-firm sales concentration ratio and t3 is the fringe firms' supply elasticity, Using the previous procedure, the oligopoly price set by the leaders is given by
The resultant oligopoly output is
::. (6) As before, QOis then used in equation (4) in order to compute an index of welfare loss for a given industty. Note that in both cases, the actual dollar value of the welfare losses divided by observed sales is equivalent to the indexed welfare losses ( WL) divided by the indexed sales (P,,QO). Hence, the actual dollar value of the deadweight loss is given by W%*WPOQO, where S is the observed dollar sales.
Consider the implications of Gisser's (1982) marginal cost assumptions for the leaders and fringe firms (8=6=1) vis-a-vis Winner's (1989) assumptions E=c0,(3=O). From (6) , it is clear that Gisser assumes the residual demand faced by the leaders to be more price elastic than in Winner's model. Thus, Gisser's model is less restrictive than Winner's under any given collusion parameter in terms of obtaining positive prices and quantity by using (5) and (6), since both require q~to exceed H' for the Coumot case and to exceed I for the collusive price leadership case. This is especially critical since food industry demands are generally price inelastic. Likewise, Gisser's model is also bound to yield lower estimates of welfare losses merely due to his marginal cost assumptions which imply a higher price elasticity of demand facing the leaders (for the same industry demand) as well as the fringe firms' ability to respond to the leaders' prices in the short run.
Data and Estimation Procedures
Based on equation (4), the computation of welfare losses using the industry-wide oligopoly model requires data on q, 6, H, a as well as dollar sales per indust~. Data for these variables were collected for 44 industries at the 4-digit SIC level for 1987, the most recent year available. The estimates of industry demand elasticity (q) were taken from Pagoulatos and Sorensen (1986), 6 The values of H and dollar sales were taken from the 1987 Census of Manufacturers.
Due to lack of data, the marginal cost flexibility parameter (E) was assumed to be equal to infinity across industries (i.e., constant marginal cost), for the industry-wide oligopoly cases. Using (1), the parameter a was estimated by &=(~q -H)/(1 -H), where~is the computed Lemer index.
As in Domowitz, Hubbard, and Peterson (1986) , the Lerner index was computed bỹ =[S+ A1-(W+M+rA)] / (S+Al), where S is dollar sales, AI is the change in inventories, W and M are the cost of labor and materials, respectively, r is the rate of discount, and A is the value of fixed assets.' The above index is corrected for the opportunity cost of capital by introducing rA.
Based on previous estimates, it was assumed that rd-1, 084 (Atlar, 1994) , Data on the value of fixed assets are obtained from the 1987 Census of Manufacturers. The above data were applied to equation (4) in order to compute the oligopol y welfare losses for all food and tobacco manufacturing industries, here atter called the baseline scenario, Five additional scenarios were simulated corresponding to industry-wide Cournot behavior as well as Gisser's and Winner's price leadership under Cournot and perfectly collusive regimes.* Note that Gisser's (1982) analysis was conducted for the food industries as a whole (SIC=20) and that he did not consider the Cournot pricing scheme. For these price leadership regimes, two combinations of leaders' marginal cost flexabilities and fringe firm supply elasticities are used, corresponding to Gisser's and Winner's assumptions, Assuming that the largest four firms are the industry leaders (n4) and that each of these firms has one-quarter of the total leading four-firm sales share, then W =H4 =(?.25 and CRn = CR4. These assumptions are made due to lack of data and for simplicity. The results are presented below.
Welfare Loss Estimates
The results for the six oligopoly pricing regimes for the food and tobacco industries at the 4-digit SIC level are presented in Table 1 . 9 The results for these industries at the 2-digit SIC level were also computed by using the weighted averages of the 4-digit level estimates, using their dollar sales as weights.'0 For consistency, the baseline scenario is a maintained hypothesis throughout the analysis even though no standard errors can be attached to its results, That is, the baseline results are treated as factual and its underlying assumptions (e.g., elasticities of demand and cost) are assumed to remain constant when a changes.
Thus, the simulation of the core model using different behavioral assumptions should be regarded as counterfactual experiments, ie., how would welfare losses change in comparison to the baseline estimates if a different value of the collusion parameter is used.
The baseline results suggest that the total estimated dollar value of welfare losses in these industries was over $10.13 billion in 1987, which corresponds to approximately 3V0 of total value of sales. The welfare losses in the food industries (SIC 20) amounted to approximately $6.34 billion or approximately 20/0 of sales. The aggregate welfare losses in the tobacco industries (SIC 21) were estimated at $3.94 bi[lion or approximately I 9'70 of sales. At the 4-digit SIC level, the estimated losses ranged from 0.14 percent of sales in the meat packing industry to over 210/0of sales in the cigarette manufacturing industry.
In terms of the baseline results, the following industries show significantly higher welfare losses compared to either the food or the tobacco industry average: SICS 2021 (creamery butter), 2043 (cereal preparation), 2082 (malt beverages), 2099 (miscellaneous foods), 2121 (cigarettes), and 2131 (chewing and smoking tobacco). Perhaps not surprisingly, most of these six industries have been the focus of various market power or antitrust related studies.
Simulating an industry-wide Cournot assumption generally resulted in lower welfare losses than the baseline results. For example, the overall welfare losses were estimated at approximately 1'A of 1987 sales for the food industries, 7°/0 for tobacco manufacturers, and 1.44% for the overall sample (cf., 3% in the baseline results). For seven industries, the Cournot assumption did not yield positive prices and quantity because the industry demand elasticity did not exceed the Herflndahl index. This, of course, does not mean that the Cournot assumption is not justifiable for these industries, but rather that the assumption does not suit the model and the data for these seven industries. 32 under Gisser's model). This illustrates the restrictiveness of Winner's marginal cost assumptions and perhaps the limited applicability of his pricing regimes to most food and tobacco industries. To further assess the differences among the welfare loss estimates, t-tests were conducted to ascertain whether the weighted means of the welfare losses estimated under the five simulated alternative scenarios were significantly different from the weighted mean welfare losses of the baseline estimates using matched samples, ]2 Of the five resultant tests, only the means from Gisser's collusive price leadership results (t= 1.98 for N=32) and Winner's Coumot results (t=l .78 for N=32) were not statistically different from the baseline means at the 5'%0 level. The null hypotheses that the means of the remaining three scenarios were not different from the mean of the baseline estimates were rejected at the 5°/0 level of significance. In sum, It should be noted that except for the baseline scenario, the other five oligopoly pricing schemes are calibrated with external assumptions about key parameters such as the collusion parameter, Such calibration/simulation was necessary due to the lack of econometrically estimated equivalent parameters. For improved estimation of allocative efficiency losses, statistical estimates of the cost and demand structure parameters will be required instead of the current practice of arbitrarily assuming their values, particularly for cost parameters.
Concluding Remarks
Based on the baseline scenario which uses collusion parameters computed from data, allocative efficiency losses from industry-wide oligopoly pricing in the U.S. food and tobacco manufacturing industries are estimated at approximately 370 of sales in 1987. In terms of the food industries alone, the estimated losses amount to slightly over 270 of sales, The estimated welfare losses for the tobacco manufacturing industries, on the other hand, amount to 19'%of their value of shipments.
Over the 44
four-digit SIC level industries, these losses ranged from 0.14 percent of sales in the meat packing industry to 2 1.56°/0 of sales in the cigarette manufacturing industry,
582
Compared to the baseline estimates, simulating an industry-wide Coumot behavior assumption led to lower welfare loss estimates, while collusive price leadership regimes showed substantially higher losses. Moreover, a comparison of the baseline welfare loss estimates with the five simulated alternative oligopoly pricing schemes showed that the industry-wide Cournot and Winner's collusive price leadership behavior may be unlikely.
However, we failed to reject the hypothesis that the Gisser-collusion and the WillnerCoumot results are significantly different fi-om our baseline results. Overall, comparison of simulated alternative oligopoly pricing schemes underscores the importance of behavioral and cost structure assumptions in determining the magnitude of allocative etliciency losses.
Some limitations of the analysis may be important. Like other similar studies, the current welfare loss estimates are subject to the functional forms assumed for cost and demand. In this regard, Shapiro (1989) , Winner and Stahl (1992) , and Connor and Peterson (1994) Note: *= Column values for a,~, !'),~, and CR4 are weighted avemges using respective sector sales as weighta.
